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Federal technology transfer legislation has encouraged increased collaboration
between the public and private sectors, including joint research ventures known
as Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs). While several
economically important technologies have been developed through CRADAs,
there is concern that CRADAs may divert public research from its central research
missions. This study compares the pattern of research resource allocation for
CRADA projects at the U.S. Department of Agriculture with research priorities
of public and private intramural agricultural research. The findings suggest that
CRADAs have attracted considerable private co-financing of joint research pro-
jects, and may have enabled public research to concentrate more resources on
research areas where private incentives are relatively weak.
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During the 1980s, federal lawmakers passed several technology transfer initiatives
that sought to better disseminate federal research results of commercial interest
(Congressional Research Service; National Academy of the Sciences). Although
agriculture was usually not the primary focus of these technology transfer initiatives,
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) responded by strengthening its public-
private partnerships in agricultural technology development (Fuglie et al.). A princi-
pal mechanism for joint public-private R&D has been the Cooperative Research and
Development Agreement (CRADA). In a CRADA, a federal laboratory and an out-
side cooperator agree to jointly develop and commercialize a technology. CRADAs
may also grant intellectual property rights to the cooperator. Since CRADAs were
first authorized by Congress in 1986, they have resulted in several economically
important technologies, including the anti-cancer drug Taxol, animal vaccines, and
various biopesticides (U.S. General Accounting Office; Day and Frisvold).
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Despite these successes, some critics have charged that CRADAs have not been
particularly efficient at commercializing technology and may divert public research
from its central research missions (Bozeman and Coker; National Academy of the
Sciences). However, evaluations of joint public-private research undertakings have
been hampered by the lack of detailed, comprehensive data on federal CRADA
projects. As a result, previous efforts to examine CRADAs have generally relied on
the case study approach (U.S. General Accounting Office; Bozeman and Coker; Day
and Frisvold; Cohen and Noll). While case studies can provide useful insights into
the operation and management, constraints, and opportunities in CRADAs, they can-
not provide a larger macro view of joint public-private research programs. Important
questions remain unanswered, particularly how public-private joint research ventures
have affected overall public research priorities, and whether these efforts have been
successful in drawing in significant private resources and co-financing. Furthermore,
previous studies have focused on CRADAs in the energy and health sectors, and
none have considered agricultural technology transfer in depth.
In this study, we hypothesize that research activities in CRADAs represent a
“middle ground” between public and private interests in research and technology
development. To test this hypothesis, we examine the pattern of research resource
allocation using data on CRADA projects entered into by the USDA between 1987
and 1995 to examine implicit research priorities in joint public-private research.
Using USDA’s detailed research classification system, we compare the allocation
of public-private research with general mission priorities in public agricultural
research and with an indicator of private agricultural research. We also examine the
public and cooperator shares of costs incurred in CRADA research for different
technology areas and trends in public research resource allocation over time. Impli-
cations for federal priorities and funding for agricultural research and technology
transfer are discussed.
Technology Transfer and Research Resource
Allocation: Hypotheses and Data
Framework of Analysis and Hypotheses
The divergence between the private and social benefits of research is well docu-
mented and has been identified as a primary reason for the private sector’s pervasive
underinvestment in science and technology (Nelson; Ruttan). However, the degree
of divergence between private and social returns to research is likely to be uneven
across technologies. Research that results in marketable, private goods, and where
intellectual property is more easily protected, is likely to provide greater incentives
for private investment. In contrast, incentives are limited for technologies that serve
more social or nonmarket goals, where results are difficult to patent, or where the
risks and uncertainties of successful commercialization are high (Fuglie et al.). Such
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CRADA program. In principle, CRADAs allow public agencies to maximize social
good, and private partners to maximize private returns.
We begin by assuming that joint public-private research provides a means of
sharing the benefits as well as the costs of R&D. By reducing research costs and
assuring the opportunity for exclusive rights to commercial development, CRADAs
allow companies to explore a broader range of alternative technologies. CRADAs
also offer cooperating firms access to the human scientific capital found within
public institutions. Because government scientific knowledge is often more basic in
nature than that of private industry, federal scientists can provide expertise private
industries may lack. The research effort itself can also give the cooperator useful
information for future R&D efforts and technology development, even if a specific
technology turns out not to be marketable. Likewise, CRADAs benefit the govern-
ment by giving its scientists insight into market demand for new technology and
industry needs and resources, as well as the information about certain lines of
research inquiry. Government research institutions may also benefit from shared
license fees and royalties.
For this analysis, we assume that the share of research expenditures allocated
among different technology areas reflects the respective priorities of the public and
private sectors. We assume that a relatively larger share of private research will be
allocated to technologies with a larger private good component. Furthermore, we
assume that public research emphasizes areas where potential social benefits are
significant but where private research incentives are weak, i.e., where the gaps
between social and private returns to research are large. We hypothesize that the
allocation of research resources in joint public-private research will reflect a middle
ground between the priorities of each partner. For joint public-private research
endeavors, we also hypothesize that the private sector will take on a larger share of
the research and development costs of technologies with a relatively large private
good component. Likewise, for joint research activities with a larger public good
component, we expect that the public-sector partner will take on a larger share of the
costs of R&D.
Research Classification
Testing these hypotheses requires judgments about the divergence of social and
private returns to research among various kinds of technologies. For this purpose we
employ the USDA’s unique classification systems for its research programs (refer
to the appendix). Using this system, agricultural research was grouped into five main
technology areas: (a) post-harvest utilization of agricultural commodities, (b) plant
production and protection, (c) animal production and health, (d) natural resources,
and (e) human health and nutrition.
We conjecture that the divergence between public and private returns to research
will be relatively small for research on post-harvest utilization, plant production and
protection, and animal production and health. Conversely, the divergence will be
relatively large for research on natural resources and human health and nutrition.126   Fall 1999 Journal of Agribusiness
The post-harvest category includes research with many private benefits, such as
new uses and processing, as well as research with more public good characteristics,
such as food safety and improved quarantine for imported products. Historically,
research on new uses and processing technology for agricultural commodities has
been dominated by the private sector (Klotz, Fuglie, and Pray). Nevertheless, while
new products and processes can often be protected through patents and trademarks,
market development of new products can entail substantial commercial risk. For
example, large investments in manufacturing scale-up may be required before
commercial viability can be determined. New classes of products may also require
significant generic advertising to inform consumers of their value. Neither of these
types of product development may be patentable, but once completed, they signif-
icantly lower the hurdle for other firms to enter the market. Thus there can remain
a “public good” component to research on new uses of agricultural commodities.
Private investment in plant and animal research has seen considerable growth
over the past several years (Klotz, Fuglie, and Pray). Stronger intellectual property
protection and increased market concentration in the plant and animal breeding
industries have strengthened private research incentives in these technologies.
However, there remain significant gaps in these private research investments. Private
incentives for several important components of crop improvement, such as germ-
plasm conservation and “pre-breeding” research, remain weak (Falck-Zepeda and
Traxler; Frey). In animal research, private incentives are relatively strong for poultry
research but are considerably weaker for large animal improvement (Johnson and
Ruttan; Fuglie, Narrod, and Neumeyer).
Divergence between public and private returns to research are probably greatest
for natural resource conservation and human health and nutrition. Technologies
resulting from this research often have a large “information” component or generate
nonmarket benefits with limited incentives for private development and commer-
cialization. Subsidies or regulations may even be necessary for adoption or uses of
such technologies. However, these categories are quite broad and may include some
technologies that are patentable and have a strong market demand, such as new
irrigation methods for improving water use efficiency. So some private interest in
these technologies can still be expected.
Research Resource Allocation Data
Using the USDA’s research classification system, we estimate the share of total
research resources devoted to each of the five technology areas in the USDA’s
Agricultural Research Service (ARS is USDA’s primary in-house research agency)
and in the USDA CRADA program. We assume the former reflects USDA’s prior-
ities for its perceived mission to provide public goods, while the latter reflects the
implicit priorities in USDA’s joint public-private research activity.
To identify an indicator of purely private research interests is more problem-
atic. Klotz, Fuglie, and Pray provide estimates for private agricultural research for
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1  For CRADA projects, the private partner may contribute funds for research carried out at the public institution,
but the public partner is prohibited by law from contributing funds for research by the private partner.
processing sectors. Unfortunately, these categories do not allow for direct compar-
ison with the USDA classifications. However, the USDA also maintains a small
research grant program to the private sector—the Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) program. The SBIR program receives proposals from small private
companies and provides funds for intramural research by those companies. SBIR
grants are assigned the same USDA classifications. To the extent that the grant
allocations reflect research interests by the private sector, they provide an indicator
of private intramural research priorities. Data include all SBIR grants allocated
between 1987 and 1995. Although SBIR grants represent only a small component
of private agricultural research (approximately $9.1 million in grants in 1996), the
composition of successful grant proposals to the SBIR program partly reveals the
market demand for agricultural innovations. An important qualification is that SBIR
grants are restricted to small firms. Thus the private research interests of sectors
where large firms predominate, such as agricultural chemicals and food processing,
may be underrepresented.
The estimates of resources devoted to joint public-private research (CRADAs) are
derived from a database maintained by the Technology Transfer Office of ARS.
Between 1987 and 1995, ARS established 528 CRADAs with nonfederal partners,
most of which were for-profit companies (thus referred to as “private”). Detailed
financial data are available for only 366 of the 528 CRADA projects. These show
total research expenditures by each partner for the project and private contributions
to ARS research activities.
1 Therefore, we present research allocation statistics for
both the share of CRADA projects (which includes data for all 528 projects) and the
share of financial resources (which includes data from only 366 projects).
Results: Resource Allocation and Co-financing 
of Joint Public-Private Research
The relative shares of research resources allocated to the five technology areas for
the public intramural research (ARS expenditures), public-private joint research
(CRADA resources), and private intramural research (SBIR grants) are shown in
table 1. Note that for private intramural research, the shares allocated to natural
resources and human nutrition are much lower than the shares to post-harvest
utilization, plant, and animal research areas. Each of the latter three categories
received between 23% and 27% of research expenditures, whereas natural resources
received only 9.5% and human nutrition less than 1%. Public agricultural research
priorities (represented by ARS research), on the other hand, are more evenly distrib-
uted among the categories. While the shares allocated to post-harvest uses, plants,
and animals are the largest, there is clearly greater interest by the public sector in
natural resources (nearly 14% of ARS research) and human nutrition research128   Fall 1999 Journal of Agribusiness













  (% of total) 
Natural Resources 13.8   4.4   6.3   9.5
Plants 36.9 32.2 36.5 25.7
Animals 17.6 23.1 17.2 23.0
Post-harvest Utilization of Agri-
   cultural Commodities 20.8 37.6 34.6 27.0
Human Nutrition and Well-Being   9.3   1.1   2.7   0.8
General   1.6   1.5   2.7   4.4
Rural Issues   —   —   —   9.6
Total 100% 100% 100%  100% 
Notes: ARS = Agricultural Research Service (the USDA’s primary in-house research agency); CRADA =
ARS joint Cooperative Research and Development Agreement with outside cooperators; SBIR = Small
Business Innovation Research grants (private-sector USDA funding).
a Based on data from 528 CRADAs initiated by ARS between 1987 and 1995. Detailed financial data on
value of research resources were available for only 366 of these projects.
(9.3% of ARS research) compared with the private sector. We believe this reflects
a larger divergence between the perceived social and private returns to research in
natural resources and human nutrition compared with the other areas.
The allocation of public-private joint research (table 1) generally conforms to our
expectations that CRADAs represent a middle ground between public and private
interests, but with some important exceptions. The shares of both the number of
CRADA projects and total dollars allocated to plant, animal, and human nutrition
research lie between those of public intramural research and private intramural
research. However, post-harvest utilization research appears to be overrepresented
and natural resources research is underrepresented in CRADA activity. Post-harvest
research made up 38% of all CRADA projects and 35% of CRADA resources, but
only 27% of private intramural research and 21% of ARS research. One explanation
may be that the SBIR program does not reflect private-sector interest in post-harvest
research because many of the companies most active in post-harvest utilization
research are too large to qualify for SBIR grants. Another explanation lies with food
safety research, which accounts for 9% of post-harvest CRADA resources. Food
safety has received increased attention from policy makers, the media, and the
justice system; therefore, new technologies would be of interest to both public and
private scientists. Regarding natural resources research, private-sector demand
revealed through SBIR grants seems to suggest a larger interest in this type of
technology than CRADAs have exploited thus far.Day-Rubenstein and Fuglie Joint Public-Private Agricultural Research   129




  Private Contributions
  (outside cooperators)
 (% of total)   
 Natural Resources 40.2   59.8
 Plants 33.4   66.6
 Animals 36.5   63.5
 Post-harvest Utilization of Agricultural
    Commodities 36.6   63.4
 Human Nutrition and Well-Being 52.0   48.0
 General 37.1   62.9
 Total 36.1   63.9
Note: Contributions are based on the value of resources contributed to 366 CRADA agreements entered into
by USDA and outside cooperators between 1987 and 1995 (69% of all CRADAs during this period).
Another way to view the allocation of resources in public-private joint research
is to examine the share of research that each party finances. In table 2, we show the
average public and private shares of research costs in CRADA agreements. These
findings conform well to our hypotheses. For joint research on post-harvest utiliza-
tion, plants, and animals, the private sector financed 63% to 67% of total R&D costs.
The private-sector share of the costs of natural resources research was somewhat less
at approximately 60%, and for human nutrition research only 48%. It is also signif-
icant that for USDA CRADAs on average, the private sector bore 64% of total R&D
costs. The relative contributions by USDA and outside collaborators indicate that the
private sector plays a substantial role in the CRADA research process.
Finally, we examine whether increased public-private collaboration in USDA’s
research programs may have been associated with a shift in public research priori-
ties. During the late 1980s and 1990s, attention to private-sector research collabo-
ration increased, not just through CRADAs, but also through exclusive patent
licensing, contract research, and other technology transfer mechanisms (Fuglie et
al.). According to our “comparative advantage” framework outlined above, greater
reliance on public-private cooperation in R&D should enable more public resources
to be shifted to areas where private incentives are weakest. Another possibility,
however, is that to build political and financial support for public research programs,
more public resources may be diverted to areas where private companies show the
greatest interest.
Table 3 compares the allocation of ARS research expenditures for the five tech-
nology areas in 1986 and 1995. Overall, ARS research allocation was fairly stable
over time. Consistent with the comparative advantage view, some public resources
were shifted to research on natural resources and human nutrition, areas where
market failures severely constrain private research incentives. Also, shares allocated
to plant and animal research, areas where private research expanded rapidly over this130   Fall 1999 Journal of Agribusiness
Table 3.  Allocation of ARS Research Funds, 1986 and 1995
Research Category 1986 1995
 (% of total) 
Natural Resources 10.96 13.35
Plants 38.38 37.70
Animals 22.49 17.30
Post-harvest Utilization of Agricultural
   Commodities 19.47 21.35
Human Nutrition and Well-Being   7.95   9.13
General   0.75   1.17
Total 100% 100%
Source: Adapted from USDA’s Current Research Information System (CRIS), Inventory of Agricultural
Research.
period, declined. But at the same time, the share of public resources devoted to post-
harvest utilization increased slightly. This is an area where private incentives are
thought to be relatively strong. Post-harvest research also seemed to receive a
disproportionately large share of joint public-private research activity (table 2).
Increased public-sector attention to post-harvest utilization may reflect not only the
interests of food and agro-processing companies, but also pressure from farm groups
for technology to expand demand for commodities to counteract low prices. The
heightened interest in food safety may be another contributing factor.
Conclusions and Implications
Resource allocation for joint research ventures between the USDA and the private
sector appears to reflect a middle ground between public and private priorities.
While the private sector on average contributes about two-thirds of the financial
resources to CRADAs, the public share is higher for areas where private incentives
are relatively low. The pattern of resource allocation among CRADAs also suggests
that the USDA may be underutilizing CRADAs for natural resources, and possibly
overutilizing CRADAs for new uses of agricultural commodities.
The evidence further suggests that closer R&D cooperation between the USDA
and the private sector may have enhanced research efficiency by enabling the public
sector to focus more resources on areas where private incentives for research are
relatively weak. The overall pattern of research allocation by USDA has remained
relatively stable over time. However, USDA research has shifted somewhat in favor
of research on natural resources and human nutrition, areas that serve important
societal needs and where market failures are most evident. There was also a small
shift in public research resources toward post-harvest utilization, an area whereDay-Rubenstein and Fuglie Joint Public-Private Agricultural Research   131
private research incentives are thought to be relatively strong. Nevertheless, even
these technologies have significant public good components. Public research can
concentrate on food safety, quarantine technologies, and basic, pre-commercial
research, leaving other applied research and technology development for private
research.
The findings and conclusions reported here should be regarded as tentative.
Further analysis is needed to understand more clearly the underlying causal factors
behind observed trends. Nevertheless, this study represents a significant step forward
in identifying broad trends in research resource allocation in joint public-private
research.
An important area for future research is a quantitative assessment of the economic
returns to alternative models for technology transfer. To date, no systematic study of
the economic impact of technologies developed under CRADAs or other new
technology transfer instruments has been undertaken. After more than a decade of
experience with these mechanisms, it should now be possible to begin measuring
and comparing economic outcomes among alternative means of transforming new
knowledge into improved goods and services.
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Appendix:
The Research Classification System
Since the 1970s, each USDA research project has been assigned to one or more codes
under the Current Research Inventory System (CRIS). With this system, examining the
allocation of research by detailed topical areas is possible. Intramural (in-house) agri-
cultural research conducted by the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and SBIR grants
to small businesses are all assigned CRIS Research Problem Area codes. In addition
to the CRIS system, ARS maintains its own internal system for classifying research,
denoted strategic planning codes (STPs). CRADA research projects, for example, are
assigned an STP code. To match and compare research allocated within ARS, CRADAs,
and to private companies through SBIR grants, we developed a correspondence, or
crosswalk, between the CRIS Research Problem Areas and the STP classification system
(table A1). While this procedure is straightforward for broad research categories such
as the ones used in this study, using more defined research areas increases the risk of
measurement error in moving between the two classification systems.
In this study, we report the allocation of research for ARS, CRADAs, and SBIR
grants according to the five main STP categories: (a) post-harvest utilization of agricul-
tural commodities, (b) plant production and protection, (c) animal production and health,
(d) natural resources, and (e) human health and nutrition. ARS also used two other STPDay-Rubenstein and Fuglie Joint Public-Private Agricultural Research   133
Table A1.  Classification of Agricultural Research into Major Technology Areas
Major
Technology Area
Assignment of STP Codes Used 
to Classify CRADA Research
Assignment of RPA Codes 
Used to Classify ARS and 
SBIR Research
Natural Resources 1.1 Atmosphere and Climate
1.2 Soil
1.3 Water
6.1 Resource Management: Systems and
Models
101, 102,
a 103, 105, 106, 107,
109, 110,
a 306, 901
Plants 2.1 Plant Production
2.2 Plant Protection
6.2 Plant Production and Protection
Systems
102,
a 111, 112, 201, 202, 204,
205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 214,
a




Animals 3.1 Animal Production
3.2 Protection of Animal and Human 
Health
6.3 Animal Production Systems
110,
a 210, 211, 212, 213, 214,
a







4.1 New Uses, New Products
4.2 Safety
4.3 Post-harvest Losses and Quality
Changes
4.4 Quality Definition, Grading, and
Assessment
6.4 Systems and Models for Conversion
and Delivery
401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406,
407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412,





5.1 Human Nutritional Requirements
5.2 Food Composition and Bioavailability
5.3 Nutritional Status and Well-Being
6.5 Human Nutrition Systems and Models
703, 704,
a 708, 709, 802, 805
Rural Issues 801, 804, 907, 908
General 6.6 General Systems Technologies
8.0 General
104, 113, 114, 203, 315, 316,
502, 506, 508, 509, 601, 603,
902, 903
Notes: STP = Strategic planning codes, defined by the Agricultural Research Service (ARS); CRADA = ARS
joint Cooperative Research and Development Agreement with outside cooperators; RPA = Resource Problem
Areas, defined by USDA’s Current Research Information System (CRIS); SBIR = Small Business Innovation
Research grants (private-sector USDA funding).
a RPA falls into more than one major technology area. In these cases, research resources in the RPA were
split (usually 50/50) between the technology areas.
categories—a systems integration research category and a small, general classification
category. Since the subcategories under systems integration correspond to the other main
categories (resource systems, plant systems, animal systems, post-harvest systems, nutri-
tion systems, and general systems technologies), we allocated systems research to these
other categories. We compute (but do not report) shares for the general research category
or a “rural issues research” category used for some SBIR grants.134   Fall 1999 Journal of Agribusiness
2  Occasionally, CRADA agreements address more than one project, while some projects involve more than one
agreement. For purposes of this analysis, we merged the data by projects.
ARS maintains a database for each CRADA that describes the nature of the research
and its timetable, and furnishes a budget of research resources to be contributed by ARS
and the outside collaborator.
2 The budget includes the value of monetary and in-kind
resources devoted to the project over its lifetime (usually two to four years). ARS pro-
vided the authors with a copy of the database describing 528 CRADAs initiated between
1987 and 1995. In the database, most projects were assigned an STP code (those without
an STP code were assigned one by the authors). Detailed financial data are available for
only 366 (69%) of the 528 CRADAs. Table 1 in the text lists the distribution of CRADA
research among the five principal technology areas by the number of projects and by
financial resources for the subset of projects with these data. Overall, the two methods
show similar results. An advantage of using the financial data is that USDA and outside
collaborators’ contributions to each project can be identified.